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By convention or by nature – Melanchthon's criticism of late medieval Ockhamist political
thought in the Commentarii in aliquot politicos libros Aristotelis
Mads Langballe Jensen, Department of History, University College London.
Abstract: The article argues that existing scholarship has missed Melanchthon's central objective in
writing  the Commentarii  in  aliquot  politicos  libros  Aristotelis.  Rather  than  merely  criticising
peasants and radical preachers, Melanchthon sought to refute the Ockhamist political thought of
Gabriel Biel and John Mair. Using Aristotle's naturalism within the theological framework of the
political  order  as  ordained  by  God  Melanchthon  criticised  the  conventionalist  account  of  the
Ockhamists, specifically the principles underlying the case for popular sovereignty or the power of
the community over the ruler. Instead he forwarded a theory of politics and constitutional monarchy
grounded in natural and positive law.
Philipp Melanchthon (1497-1560), who was close collaborator of Martin Luther (1483-1546) and
professor in Greek at the University of Wittenberg, was the first to write comprehensive Lutheran
treatises on moral philosophy and commentaries on Aristotle, exerting a significant influence on
universities throughout Protestant Europe.1 While he has been generally overshadowed by Luther
and  the  Gnesio-Lutherans  in  the  works  of  intellectual historians,  and  especially  historians  of
political  thought,  this  picture is slowly changing.2 Despite the fact that it  is the most explicitly
political text written by a first-generation Lutheran reformer his Commentarii in aliquot politicos
libros Aristotelis, first published in 1530, has still received relatively little attention.3 Moreover, the
crucial question what was Melanchthon's chief objective in writing the  Commentarii has seldom
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been asked or substantially answered. Most discussions of the text have approached it with one or
other specific interests in mind that may be said to be peripheral to the main concerns of the text,
such as the development of resistance theory or Melanchthon's contribution to jurisprudence.4
By far the most common argument – or rather assumption, the communis opinio – is the
view that the Commentarii is directed chiefly at the radical reformers of the Peasants' War. Guido
Kisch sees the commentary chiefly as an argument that the state is a divine ordinance, enabling the
use of Roman law against the biblicism of the radical preachers.5 The same approach underlies
Ralph Keen's analysis, which adds the “caesaro-papists” as a polemical target.6 The most recent
treatment of the Commentarii by Noah Dauber deals at length with Melanchthon's criticism of the
peasants, adding the verdict that the commentary fails to treat the 'questions of political theory per
se' of the Peasants' War, being more proper to an age of absolutism.7 These views are not without
some justification, since the radical preachers are explicitly criticised in the commentary. However,
this is only half the story, and arguably the less significant half in understanding what Melanchthon
was doing, and thus the place of the Commentarii in the history of political thought.
This article argues instead that the most significant context for understanding Melanchthon's
chief objective is provided by contemporary Ockhamist political thought. The Commentarii shows
that Melanchthon was familiar with Ockhamist political thought, and it is in critical dialogue with
this strand of thought, drawing on some aspects while criticising others, that Melanchthon develops
his own account of political authority and order. This argument rests principally on three passages
in the text. In book 3 Melanchthon refers to John Mair, as well as to William of Ockham and those
who argue like him. In view of these references, I shall argue that a third passage discussing the
iurisconsulti is in fact also directed against contemporary Ockhamists. It will also be suggested that
the political and social upheavals of the early 1520s, and the influence of Luther's political thought,
led  Melanchthon to  re-evaluate  and critically  engage  with  key aspects  of  Ockhamists  political
thought. The arguments that Melanchthon singled out for criticism were precisely those that were
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crucial to the conciliarists' position, particularly with regard to the notion of popular sovereignty,
and as such could lend support to rebellious action against the rulers. Melanchthon thus develops
the Ockhamist position in a distinctively monarchist direction, not merely on theological grounds,
but also by determining the character of and relations between political authority and order in his
Aristotelian  political  philosophy.  It  will  be  argued  Melanchthon's  position  in  the  Commentarii
presents a form of constitutionalism that is anchored not in popular sovereignty but rather in natural
and positive law. Government as such is founded in natural law while the need to secure rule for the
common good through the rule of law suggests the need for a form of constitutionalism: a division
of powers within the constitution or governmental structure according to positive law.
To make this argument, the article will first, in section 1, give an overview of the character
of Ockhamist political thought at the eve of the Reformation, exemplified by Gabriel Biel (+1495)
and John Mair (c. 1467-1550). Section 2 will then show how Melanchthon can be said to belong to
this school of political thought. Against this background, section 3 of the article offers a detailed
discussion of  the  Commentarii and  the  specific  criticisms of  contemporary Ockhamist  political
thought. Section 4 will then determine Melanchthon's own position in more detail. In this way, the
article aims to determine the character of at least one kind of 'Lutheran' political thought and its
place in the history of political thought - not by asking the question of whether it was conducive to
the later development of absolutism or a specific canonical political doctrine, such as resistance
theory,  but  in  understanding  its  relationship  to  its  intellectual  context,  namely  the  political
arguments and positions forwarded in its day.
I
Melanchthon  read  Ockham's  Dialogus in  the  summer  of  1529,8 but  his  familiarity  with  late
mediaeval Ockhamist political thought pre-dates that. It is well established that both Luther and
Melanchthon received their university education in the via moderna, and it has been argued that the
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moral theology developed at  the University of Tübingen by Gabriel  Biel was significant to the
Lutheran  Reformation.9 According  to  Melanchthon,  Luther  knew  Gabriel  Biel  intimately.10
Melanchthon read Gabriel Biel and Jean Gerson at Tübingen, and would later in life praise Gabriel
Biel  as  the  most  perspicuous  of  philosophers,  although  erroneous  on  many  points.11  In  the
Commentarii, Melanchthon refers to 'the Parisian theologian' John Mair.12 In the early 16th century
the University of Paris was well-known for its Ockhamist leanings and conciliarists sympathies.
Mair  was instrumental  in  training  a  generation of  students  in  Ockhamist  philosophy,  including
Jacques Almain, who wrote commentaries on several of Ockham's writings. The two were engaged
in public polemics with Cardinal Cajetan concerning the status of the Council of Pisa, a debate
which pitted an Ockhamist and conciliarist position against a Thomist and papalist one.13 In this
context we may point to a number of continuities between William of Ockham's political thought
and  that  of  his  later  followers,  Gabriel  Biel  and  John  Mair,  that  are  relevant  to  the  present
discussion.
In Ockham's political thought it is axiomatic that political authority is invested in the ruler
by the election and consent of the ruled, an axiom that is accorded the status of natural law: “no one
should be set over the whole body of mortals except by their election and consent.” He further
argues that this principle may be said to be have the status of divine law as well, since natural laws,
equated with right reason, may be considered to be divine laws. Ockham sums up the argument
thus: “the Romans have the right to elect the highest pontiff from natural law spoken of in the third
way. For supposing that someone is to be set over certain persons as prelate, ruler, or rector, it is
inferred  by  evident  reason  that,  unless  the  contrary  is  decided  on  by  the  person  or  persons
concerned, those whom he is to be set over have the right to elect the one to be set over them, so
that no one should be given to them against their will.”14  Ockham argues this both in relation to the
Emperor and the Pope, and this principle would become fundamental to later Ockhamist thinkers.
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Gabriel Biel's account of political authority is found in questions 2 and 5 to distinction 15 of the
fourth book of the Sentences (published in 1501). While Biel mainly follows Duns Scotus on these
questions, also quoting Thomas Aquinas and Gregory's  Moralia, the general argument is in line
with  Ockham's  position  concerning  consent.  In  distinction  15  of  book  four  Biel  discusses
restitution, and to this effect sets out to determine the origin of private property, the problem being
discussed in question 2.  It is axiomatic for Biel that according to natural law property is to be held
in common, to which effect he cites the Digest VIII dist. Cap. 1 Quo iure (quoting Augustine) and
Clemens XII q. 1 Dilectissimis. Following Duns Scotus, Biel argues that as the natural law precept
concerning communal  property had been revoked after  the Fall  the question  becomes  by what
authority the division of property had been introduced. This could have been done, he argues, either
by paternal authority according to natural law, or by political authority derived from the common
consent and election of the community.15 In Biel there is thus a clear distinction between paternal
authority following from natural law, and political authority deriving from the consent and election
of the community. According to Biel, when several people came together to live in the same place
who did not have the same father and thus no common natural authority over them, they realised
that they could not live in peace if they did not submit to the rule of a common power, either the
government of one or several persons.16 
Having determined that  political  authority  is  one  legitimate  source  of  the  distinction  of
property, he proceeds to discuss the nature of political authority in question 5. He is explicit that
political  authority,  the “potestas  dominandi”,  of Romans 13 although from God was not  found
before the Fall and therefore not natural to man, but rather created and granted by human law: 
This [i.e. potestas dominandi] is not natural to the race of men, and it would not be found in the state
of uncorrupted nature. For all humans spring from the same root, namely from Adam and Eve, to
whom possession and the liberty of all things was common by natural right, as Isidore says in the fifth
book of the Etymologiae. But because of the sin of men, just as the division of things is made so is the
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power of ruling also conceded by human law.17
Citing  Gregory's  Moralia to  elaborate  on  this,  Biel  argued that  given this  fundamental  natural
equality of men, only after the fall did God give a “dispensation” and (citing Alvarus Pelagius)
“permitted” that political authority and servitude be introduced by the consent of the people. A little
later in the same question, Biel cites the Digest and Gregory again to argue explicitly that servitude
was  introduced  contrary  to  nature  and  according  to  the  ius  gentium.18 The  conclusion  is  that
although just titles to rule may now be acquired in various ways, such as by election of the people,
just war against infidels or rebels, legitimate succession or institution by a superior, they are all
derived from the original consent and election of the people.19 From this two corollaries follow, one
that the lord has been instituted for the sake of the people and not the other way around, and second
that the lord must rule for the common good and benefit of the commonwealth or otherwise be a
tyrant.20
John  Mair  developed  his  account  of  the  origin  and  character  of  political  authority  in  his
commentary on the fourth book of the Sentences, distinction 15, question 10.21 It was published in
1519 but Mair had finished writing it by 1516, as evidenced by the prefatory letters, which are both
dated December 1516.22 On the whole Mair's discussion is very similar to Biel's, supplementing the
account with classical authorities such as Cicero, Ovid and Aristotle. Mair starts by discussing the
origin of private property, “whether the dominia of things were distinguished by natural, divine or
human law.”23 He cites the Digest VIII dist. Cap. 1 Quo iure, Gratian Dist. 8 ante c. 1 (“Nam iure
naturali omnia sunt communia omnibus”), as well as Cicero's  De officiis, to argue that before the
Fall all things were in common, whereas after the Fall the division of things, that is private property,
was introduced by human law.24 After having discussed whether servitude was introduced according
to reason, Mair goes on to argue that the requirement for a legitimate division of dominia in things
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is just law, which in turn requires authority and prudence.25 This is the starting point of Mair's
discussion of political authority in more detail, focusing on two related problems: by which way
kings  have  their  kingdoms and territories,  and whether  they have  the  same  dominium in  their
kingdom as Mair has in his Bible. 
Like  Biel  before  him,  Mair  starts  from  the  distinction  between  paternal  and  political
authority, in this place quoting book 1 of Aristotle's Politics: “the paternal power of the father over
his children is from natural law no matter where they live. According to book one of the Politics
political power is different, and that belongs to a person by the consent of those over whom he has
that power as long as they reside in his jurisdiction, whether they descend from him or not.” 26 Here
Mair builds on one of Aristotle's objectives in chapter 1, namely that of refuting the opinion of Plato
that political rule and the rule of a father of a house is essentially the same. Aristotle had argued that
political authority was distinct from both the rule of a father over his children and of a master over
his slaves. Thus he set out at the beginning of the first chapter of book one the opinion “that the
qualification of a statesman, king, householder, and master are the same, and that they differ, not in
kind, but only in the number of their subjects (…) As if there were no difference between a great
household and a small state.” He then argued that this view was mistaken and then went on in the
rest of book one to consider the elements of the state in order to show “in what the different kinds of
rules differ from one another”.27 
Having  established  the  fundamental  distinction  between  paternal  and political  authority,
Mair  offers  a  brief  history  of  how  the  various  states,  whether  democracies,  aristocracies,  or
monarchies, came into being. Despite local and temporal variations, the fundamental point is this:
“the people, seeing that in the fallen state that if criminals were not punished society (politiam)
would not remain, agreed upon a prudent man, whom they wished to have the care over the whole
people with the fullness of legitimate power for punishing criminals”.28 From this follow three
consequences: that kings were instituted for the good of the people as the principal member of the
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whole; secondly that the whole people is superior to the king and may depose him in certain cases.
Further the king may not alienate his kingdom or change its form at will, for this power was not
conceded by the  people.  Rather  the people  remains  free.29 The answer to  the  question  Mair  is
exploring – whether a king can be said to have the same kind of  dominium over his kingdom as
Mair has over his Bible – is therefore in the negative.30
In his Exposition of Matthew, published in 1518, Mair had explored the relation between the
power of the people or the community and the ruler at greater length, following essentially the same
argument concerning the relation between the community and the ruler that he employed in the
Sentences. In the Exposition Mair was chiefly concerned with refuting Cardinal Cajetan's criticism
of Almain's case for conciliar primacy over the Pope.31 Fundamental to Mair's case is the analogous
nature of the ecclesiastical and a secular polity, and the fact that Christ, as the best of legislators,
had instituted the best form of government in the church – monarchy. In the best polity the body
politic precisely has a remedy against the head if the head works to the destruction of the body.
Against the Cardinal's argument that this means that there would be two supreme powers in the
church, Mair replies that there is only one, namely in the people, and that the king's power is merely
ministerial.32 According to Mair, then, what distinguishes an unfree or enslaved people from a free
people is that the latter is able to depose its ruler. Mair's point is that according to the ordination of
God this is the case for all legitimate political rule, both in the Church and in secular polities. No
legitimate political rule is therefore rule over slaves, but qua political the rule over free people.
While  Mair  goes  a step further  than Biel  in  explicitly arguing that  the whole people is
superior  to the ruler  and may depose him,  his  account  of the source and character  of  political
authority is therefore the same as that of Biel in its essentials. We may summarise the fundamental
points of the Ockhamist position thus: firstly, man is held to be free according to natural law and
civil  dominium, both in terms of property and its jurisdictional or political sense, is introduced by
human  law.  Secondly,  political  authority  and  rule  is  based  on  the  consent  and election  of  the
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community, as opposed to paternal authority which is founded on natural law.  Finally, this means
that political rule is rule over free persons and a free community, which has the power to depose a
tyrannical ruler. The ruler's authority is therefore only ministerial in relation to the community.33
The significance of this conciliarist argument in the history of political thought is widely held to be
that it was instrumental in the development of arguments for popular sovereignty, resistance, and
constitutional monarchy in the 16th and 17th centuries.34
II
Not only was Melanchthon familiar with the conciliarist polemics earlier in the 16 th century,  as
suggested by his reference to Mair in the  Commentarii, but he was also familiar with Ockhamist
thought in an academic context from his time at Tübingen, where he was particularly influenced by
Gabriel Biel and Jean Gerson, through his teachers Conrad Summenhart and Wendelin Steinbach.35
Melanchthon would in 1538, and later in 1546, quote Gerson approvingly on the obligatory force of
law,36 and Gerson was, along with Ockham, particularly influential at the University of Paris. In this
way, Melanchthon may be said to share a common intellectual background with the Ockhamists we
shall  see him criticising in the  Commentarii.  Here we may point  to two significant  issues:  the
equation  of  the  judgement  of  natural  reason,  natural  law  and  divine  law;  and  the  concept  of
dominium.
It  was  a common argument among late  mediaeval  scholastics,  reaching back at  least  to
William of Ockham and Duns Scotus, that the firm judgement of natural reason is natural law,
which in turn may be given status of divine law. None the less there was a certain ambiguity in the
use of natural law with regards to its specific content, an ambiguity found both in John Mair and
Gabriel Biel. This can be seen, for instance, in Mair's discussion of dominium in his commentary on
the  Sentences.  That  ambiguity  follows  from the  fact  that  as  well  as  being  identified  with  the
judgement of natural reason, natural law is seen as the law associated with the situation before the
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fall, the state of complete nature (status naturae integrae). Thus natural law prescribes community
of  dominium while distinct  dominium is introduced, reasonably, by civil law. The same approach
underlies Mair's discussion of servitude. He argues that servitude was introduced reasonably,  or
according to reason, and answers the objections based on the Roman law passages which say that
slavery is contrary to natural law, with the argument that Justinian, being a holy man, was speaking
about the situation before the Fall.37 There is thus no clear connection or identification between
what  is  reasonable  and  what  is  according  to  natural  law.  Likewise  for  Biel  the  natural  law
concerning the community of things was revoked after the fall  and distinct  dominia reasonably
introduced.  This  structure  rests  on  the  manifold  distinction  between  laws  in  late  mediaeval
scholasticism. In his discussion of  dominium Mair distinguishes between eight different forms of
dominium according to the law by which they are held. In this way he enumerates, for instance,
natural, evangelical, divine, canonical and civil law and corresponding forms of  dominium.38 Biel
operates with a distinction between principally divine law, natural law, the ius gentium, canon law
and civil law.
In  comparison  with  his  Scholastic  contemporaries,  Melanchthon  presents  a  significant
simplification of the theory of law, which is in part premised on the new Lutheran understanding of
the gospel and the distinction between gospel and law as well as building on Ockhamist premises.
The gospel may no longer be conceived of as law, and so the concept of evangelical law becomes a
contradiction in terms. In Melanchthon's Commentarii the identification between the judgement of
natural reason and natural law becomes paramount, and replaces the association between natural
law and the prelapsarian world.39 In extension of the Ockhamist position he argues that “the law of
nature truly is divine law.”40 Both in the commentary on the Politics and in his commentary on book
5 of the Ethics Melanchthon identifies natural law and the ius gentium, both being derived from the
dictates of natural reason.41 The only distinction made with regards to natural laws is the degree of
certainty with which they can be derived from the first principles of reason. As such there are only
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two levels of laws in Melanchthon: positive law enacted by a given ruler and deriving its obligatory
force (autoritas) from the “authority of the ruler,” and natural law which, as we shall see below,
provides both the normative foundation for political authority and a limiting criteria for the range of
legitimate positive law.42 As such Melanchthon is part of a larger 16th and 17th century concern with
clarifying the status of and relations between natural law and the ius gentium and the corresponding
foundation of the state or city.43 I shall be arguing that Melanchthon's case against Ockham, Biel
and Mair depends crucially on this further development of the Ockhamist position.
The second area of common ground is constituted by the shared criticism of the radical
Augustinianism of Richard Fitzralph and his pupil John Wycliffe. It was a long standing concern of
the Ockhamists in Paris to refute Fitzralph's and Wycliffe's doctrine that natural and civil dominium
are founded on grace, going back to Pierre d'Ailly, Gerson and the Council of Constance. In doing
so they argued that natural dominium is founded rather in the natural order of God, on natural law.44
Towards the end of the Commentarii, in a passage entitled “the magistrate may rule even though he
is an unbeliever.” Melanchthon forwards a similar argument against Wycliffe. Wycliffe, he tells us,
had  contended  that  “those  who  do  not  have  the  Holy  Spirit  lose  dominium.”45 Against  this,
Melanchthon argues that rather than being founded on grace, natural and civil dominium pertain to
man by virtue of his nature and his natural reason. Thus when Adam sinned and fell from grace “he
did not lose his dominium since he did not lose his reason. For natural dominium is nothing except
the judgement of reasoning determining how and in what way we should use natural things to
preserve life.”46 Here Melanchthon offers a definition of  dominium that is in significant respects
similar to those offered by the Parisian Ockhamists.47 Where they differ is on the foundation of civil




The Commentarii in aliquot politicos libros Aristotelis consists of commentaries on the first three
books of the Politics, with discussions of various of the topics dealt with in these books, prefaced
by a dedicatory letter and an introduction. In the introduction Melanchthon has two objectives. He
briefly defines political philosophy, and then justifies its use to Christians, clarifying the distinction
between  political  philosophy  and  the  gospel.  Political  philosophy  (politica)  is  described  as
“knowledge (ars) containing general precepts concerning the order of the state (civitatis) (…) it
describes the form of the state, discusses private property, the rulers, the laws, the duties of subjects,
contracts and punishments.”48 It is true that in the introduction Melanchthon singles out various
radical  reformers and the Roman Popes for criticism, but this  is  for their  failing to distinguish
properly between the gospel and political philosophy, thinking that “the gospel is nothing but a
doctrine of politics, according to which states must be established.”49  Thus John Wycliff, Wolfgang
Capito, Huldrych Zwingly and the Anabaptists all wanted to establish laws according to the gospel,
and  the  Roman  Popes  usurped  the  rights  to  bestow  kingdoms.50 But  this,  however,  is  not
Melanchthon's main argument. Rather, it is merely a preliminary discussion setting the scene for his
engagement with Aristotle's Politics and the arguments discussed therein. Politics proper is not the
subject of theology or the domain of theologians, and it will be just as ridiculous for theologians to
determine matters of politics as it would for them to interfere in the practice of medicine. Against
both  the  popes  and  the  radical  reformers,  Melanchthon  argues  that  the  gospel  pertains  to  the
spiritual and eternal justice,  and that in addition there is a need for political philosophy, which
describes the order of the world. The gospel approves of all laws and political orders that are in
accordance with reason. The magistrate holds an office from God, and subjects must therefore obey
their ruler as the vicar of God.51
At the outset  of his  commentary on book one of the  Politics,  Melanchthon again introduces  a
definition  of  political  philosophy:  “Political  philosophy  discusses  civil  society  and  the  duties
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pertaining to society, and deduces the causes of society from nature.”52 Accordingly he argues that it
is the chief merit of Aristotle's Politics that it shows the natural causes of society and of government
according to a strict method. Aristotle's method starts from the “principles taken from the nature or
the  end  of  man,”  that  is  “the  laws  or  common sentences  inscribed  in  nature”  which  it  is  the
“business of the philosopher to determine and explain.” Moreover, what can be derived from these
first principles according to a firm method may be considered a law of nature and as such divine
law: “ius naturae vere esse ius divinum.”53 The principles or laws of nature derived from the nature
of man and found in the Politics are in Melanchthon's view, that “man is created for society,” “the
first society is the legitimate marriage between man and wife,” “from the first society comes the
household, in which are parents, children and slaves,” and “in a society of many it is necessary that
some rule and some obey.”54 According to Melanchthon's reading of Aristotle, government, that is
rule  and  subjection,  is  a  functional  requirement  of  society.  And  it  is  this  observation  that
Melanchthon puts to use in arguing that government has natural causes, that it exists in accordance
with  and  as  prescribed  by  natural  law.  In  doing  so,  Melanchthon  uses  Aristotle's  argument
concerning natural slavery to give the natural foundation for government in general.
Aristotle gathers the causes of subjection and rule [servitutis et imperii]. For according to nature the
more ignorant and weak obey those that are more knowing and stronger, for they need the command,
guidance, and defence of others. He adduces proof of this fact from the parts of man. In man some
parts naturally serve and others naturally rule and govern, likewise therefore in the multitude the more
knowing should rule and the ignorant obey.55
In short, Aristotle shows that “civil society cannot be maintained without  imperium.” It is usually
assumed that Melanchthon was, when dealing with the concept of servitus, chiefly concerned with
justifying slavery and serfdom in the terms of Aristotle's arguments for natural slavery against the
revolting peasants, or that Melanchthon was grounding government in natural slavery.56 However, it
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is clear that when Melanchthon deals with the natural causes of servitus, this is as the counterpart of
imperium or rule, such as in speaking of “causae servitutis et imperii” (the causes of subjection and
rule), the two fundamental kinds of which are δεσποτικόν and βασιλικόν or πολιτικόν.57 Servitus,
then, refers not to slavery or serfdom as such, but refers to the fact that some are subject to the rule
of others. Whether it refers to slavery therefore depends on what kind of imperium it is related to.
Strictly speaking, Melanchthon is not properly using Aristotle's argument for natural slavery, but
adapting it so as to ground a hierarchy of rulers and ruled in general.
This may also be seen from Melanchthon's treatment of the disagreement between Aristotle
and iurisconsulti who have argued that “servitude is contrary to nature, and that according to natural
law  human  beings  are  initially  born  free.”58 Rather  than  having  specific  lawyers  in  mind,
Melanchthon here seems to have in mind the Roman law passages  l. Ex hoc iure  (D. 1.1.5) and
especially the Institutes (Inst. 1.2.1): “for at the demands of practice and human necessities, human
nations established certain things for themselves: wars arose and there followed captivities  and
servitudes,  which  are  contrary  to  natural  law.”59 Rather  than  positing  an  absolute  opposition
between the position of Aristotle and the lawyers, Melanchthon argues that they are reconcilable.
Aristotle speaks of the cause of servitude, why it is necessary, and the lawyers of a specific form of
servitude, slavery proper. 
Aristotle talks about the cause of the servitude, which the jurists refer to. The jurists talk about the
effect, or a certain form of servitude. Servitude in Aristotle signifies the imbecility of the nature, [of
him] that must be governed by the judgement of another. In the jurists it signifies the specific form, by
which the victorious [in war] subdues the defeated.60
Although Melanchthon claims to reconcile the two positions, the argument in fact comes out in
favour of  Aristotle,  or  at  least  his  reading of  Aristotle.  Melanchthon argued with Aristotle  that
because  of  the  weakness  of  human  nature,  and the  frailty  of  the  minds  of  some people,  it  is
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necessary that some are ruled by others. And if  they would do not agree to that,  they must be
constrained by force in order to preserve human society. “If they will not allow themselves to be
ruled they must be constrained and contained by force, in order that the rest of the human race may
be conserved, just as it is necessary to cut of corrupt parts of the body so that the entire body does
not perish.”61. From this it is therefore clear that society cannot exist without government, and that
rule and subjection therefore have natural causes; they are constituted according to natural law. The
positions in the debate become clearer when we keep the positions of Biel and Mair in mind. Biel,
as  we saw in  section  II,  posited  a  natural  equality  among  men and argued  that  servitude  and
government were contrary natural law. Mair read Aristotle to argue that political rule was rule of, in
political terms, fundamentally free and equal people and that political rule was based on human law
and convention. Melanchthon, also using Aristotle, instead posits a fundamental inequality as the
basis of rule and social order.62 This, however, is not a theory of a general inequality between two or
more identifiable groups, such as between Aristotle's natural rulers and natural slaves, but rather one
that points to the general fact that some, in fact most, people need to be constrained by force, that is
governed, in order to maintain society. In referring to the disagreement between the  iurisconsulti
and Aristotle, Melanchthon in effect pits his own position against the Ockhamists in order to show
the natural, rather than conventional, source of government.
In so far as Melanchthon was arguing against the peasants and the radical preachers involved
in the peasant uprisings here, he was not so much arguing for serfdom as shifting the position of the
radical preachers so that they appeared to deny the legitimacy of government and subjection in
general. Whereas Aristotle rightly criticised those who “out of and immoderate and unjust love of
liberty” argued that servitude is contrary to nature, Melanchthon more justly, he argued, criticised
the fanatical  people of his  own time “who claim that  servitude is  contrary to the gospel.”63 In
arguing both against the lawyers and the “fanatical people” of the peasant uprisings, Melanchthon
introduces  an  argument  from the  fourth  commandment,  arguing  that  it  “subjects  all  people  to
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servitude,” and that  since the gospel does not  abolish this  commandment “likewise it  does not
condemn neither government nor servitude.” This is a further indication that Melanchthon sees the
questions of government and servitude, whether in the form of slavery or not, as inextricably linked.
In this connection Melanchthon argues that the fourth commandment has the status of natural law,
“since this sentence is inscribed in nature, one must likewise know that the causes of subjection are
truly given in nature” (426). As we have seen, both Biel and Mair argued that the duty to honour
and obey one's  parents  stemmed from natural  law.  By subsuming political  authority under  this
commandment,  Melanchthon  makes  a  crucial  departure  from  this  tradition  and  sidesteps  the
question of consent that was traditionally implied in the distinction between paternal and political
authority. The question of consent, however, is precisely what Melanchthon discusses in the second
relevant passage in the commentary on book 3 (see below p. 16).
Melanchthon's treatment of the second book of the Politics is relatively brief, the book being in his
words totus historicus.64 It is mostly concerned with discussing the differences between the politics
of Plato and Aristotle. There is however one passage of relevance to our discussion, the discussion
of property. In the Republic, Plato argued that both women and property should be common among
the  guardian  class,  a  sentiment  criticised  by Aristotle.  Melanchthon  uses  this  discussion  as  an
occasion  to  discuss  various  contemporary  opinions.  He  mentions  that  the  opinion  of  Plato
concerning communal property has become common among theologians, and cites the opinion that
the gospel commands community of property and distinction eight in the Decretals stating that “by
divine law everything is common to everybody.”65 (431). As we have seen both Gabriel Biel and
John Mair  cited  the  Decretals  to  this  effect,  arguing further  that  by natural  law all  things  are
common. Melanchthon's remarks concerning the Decretals aptly exemplifies his general approach
to Ockhamist political  thought.   He sums up his position by stating that “the opinions that the
community of property is according to divine or evangelical law must in no way be accepted, since
16
they are the roots of great revolts.”66 He then goes on to correct this reading of the  Decretals,
arguing that in truth it shows that God is the author “of the legitimate division of things” as it states
that “God gives human law to the human race through the rulers and the overseers of the world.”
Those who argued that according to natural law all things are common are somewhat excused,
however, by the fact that they speak of the state before the fall. “When we, however, speak of the
present state after the Fall we rightly say that the division of things is by natural law,” for natural
reason  sees  that  the  division  of  things  is  necessary,  “and  natural  reason  is  natural  law.”67
Melanchthon explicitly  cites  the  iurisconsulti  as  being in  agreement  with  Aristotle  that  private
property is  in accordance with nature,  that  is  the law of nature and  ius gentium.68 This line of
argumentation shows that Melanchthon's case against the Ockhamists depends on his identification
of divine law, natural law and the ius gentium.  The Ockhamists, then, are not merely mistaken on
intellectual grounds. Their position, although to some extent excusable, is inherently dangerous as it
leads to rebellion and disturbances of the established order. 
In the commentary on the third book of the  Politics, Melanchthon starts by reiterating the main
points from the two previous books, that Aristotle shows that society is natural and government
necessary for  maintaining  society,  and that  therefore  rule  and subjection  have  natural  causes.69
Melanchthon then, in accordance with Aristotle's text, proceeds to discuss “the various forms of rule
in states” (435). After having paraphrased Aristotle's definition of a state (civitas), of citizens (cives)
and a constitution in general (politia), he briefly defines the three legitimate and the three corrupt
forms of constitution according to the Aristotelian scheme.70 The commentary then proceeds with a
lengthy discussion of the best form of constitution,  monarchy, and in this  section Melanchthon
engages in explicit discussion and criticism of the Ockhamist position. He starts first by treating the
question of universal monarchy, of whether it is proper for one man to be the king of the entire
world.71 In  repudiating  the  view  that  the  Pope  should  be  the  monarch  of  the  entire  world,
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Melanchthon  distinguishes  between  the  office  of  priests,  which  is  to  teach  the  gospel,  and
government. The latter is defined, citing Romans 13, as “the power to give laws in order to prevent
bodily harm and injury, and to wield the sword to make people obey, and to punish those who do
not obey the laws.” Melanchthon argues that this power was instituted in Genesis 9,6 and engages
in explicit polemics against the Ockhamists in a passage worth quoting at length:
If clear proof is needed, imperium is indeed instituted in these words said to Noah: “Whoso sheddeth
man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed.” Furthermore, it is the judgement of natural reason that
there must be some who rule. And as we have often said, divine law is natural law, or the judgement of
natural  reason.  And  imperium has  been  instituted  in  this  commandment:  Honour  your  father  and
mother. For this commands obedience towards superiors.  Some, like Ockham, falsely say that the
consent of the people confers imperium. [This is false,] for princes also rule the unwilling by right and
rightfully hold imperium not merely by the consent of the people but also through legitimate war, the
oppression of criminals and legitimate succession etc.72
Several important points can be drawn from this quotation. First, Melanchthon clarifies the nature
of divine ordination. There is no contradiction between political authority being ordained by God on
the  one  hand (as  testified  to  by Genesis  9,  6  and the  fourth  commandment),  and government
existing according to natural law (the fourth commandment again and the “natural judgement of
reason”) and in virtue of some kind of human mediation. The crucial question is: what is the source
of imperium? Second, Melanchthon here explicitly connects the discussion of Ockham and consent
with the discussion of book 1 concerning the foundation and institution of rule and subjection, and
again  Melanchthon  forwards  the  same  arguments:  natural  law  and  the  fourth  commandment.
Melanchthon effectively denies that natural law or natural reason posits any notion of election and
consent  as the origin of political  authority,  as Ockham would have it. Criticising Ockham also
provides a ready way of attacking those, such as Biel and Mair, who like him “falsely say that the
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consent of the people confers imperium”. Indeed, Melanchthon's view on consent is an almost exact
inversion of Biel's position. Melanchthon mentions the same proximate causes for, and sources of,
possession of legitimate imperium. But while in Biel they are all reducible ultimately to the consent
of the people, in Melanchthon the consent and election by the people is only one among many
sources. Moreover, in the context of the commentary with its emphasis on the weakness of the
nature or irrationality of men and the consequent need for subjection and rule, it is unlikely that
such a consent is would be present.  Melanchthon differs, then, sharply from the Ockhamists in
arguing that political power exists according to natural law rather than human law or the law of
nations. 
The final explicit  engagement with the Ockhamists is  found under the section discussing  “the
various forms of kingship,” and can be said to function as a summary of Melanchthon's case against
the Ockhamists. The section contains a brief discussion of the various forms of kingship that have
historically  existed,  from  the  kings  of  heroic  times  to  Melanchthon's  own  time.  Melanchthon
defines a king as “a highest power, over which no superior magistrate judges.”73 The first kind of
kingship in heroic was unrestrained by laws and ruled for “the good of the people.” However,
because of the tendency of unrestrained kingly rule to degenerate into tyranny a second form of
kingship  was  introduced,  “supreme  power  (summum  imperium)  circumscribed  by written  law”
where the rule of law is enforced against the king by custodes. As the guardians have the right to
constrain  the  kings,  the  kings  cannot  here  be  said  to  be  αὐτοκράτορες or  ἀνυπεύθυνοι.74 This
discussion leads Melanchthon to pose the further  problem of  “whether  private  people may kill
tyrants” or whether subjects may resist their ruler by force if he injures them contrary to the laws.
This question, he argues, is easy to answer for the Christian, for the Gospel prohibits any form of
“private vengeance.” Likewise, the subject is not merely obligated to obey the ruler because of the
covenant (pactum) between ruler and subjects but also “by the mandate of God, which commands to
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honour evil  magistrates as well.”75 Both of these discussions thus concern the relative rights of
rulers and subjects, the varying configuration of rights is what distinguishes one form of kingship
from another.
This  discussion  leads  Melanchthon  to  ask  the  question  “which  kind  of  kingship  God
approves of.” Concerning this topic he says, “there are various disputations among theologians, and
some argue that subjects are everywhere slaves, and have nothing of their own. Others argue that
this harshness of servitude is contrary to the Gospel.”76 The question then is a continuation of the
previous sections. Put differently, the question is whether God approves of forms of rule where the
subjects are slaves and therefore have no right against their rulers. Melanchthon rejects outright the
position which criticises servitude as being contrary to the Gospel, that is on religious grounds – a
position that is identified with the 12 Articles of the Swabian Peasants. On the other hand, he refers
to a discussion of the problem of whether subjects are everywhere slaves as a topic of political
philosophy:  “The  former  [opinion],  which  I  remember  discussed  by  John  Mair  the  Parisian
theologian,  deserves  some  examination.”77 This  is  indicative  of  Melanchthon's  attitude  to  the
peasants and the Ockhamists respectively. Whereas the position of the peasants is flatly rejected as
confusing the Gospel and politics, Melanchthon takes the position of Mair seriously as a piece of
political reasoning.
As mentioned in section I, Mair had discussed this topic in his exposition of the Gospel of
Matthew in 1518 and in his commentary on the Sentences from 1519. Mair's discussion concerned
precisely the rights of the people or the subjects against their rulers. As we saw, Mair's argued that
given the nature of political authority itself the people must be said to be free and have the right to
depose the ruler. Against Mair, Melanchthon forwards a strict constitutional pluralism, arguing that
God approves of all legitimate forms of government, that is forms of government that punish evil
and reward good, and that are in accordance with the judgement of reason and the laws of nature.
Following  his  Aristotelian  naturalism,  the  appropriate  form  of  government  depends  on  local
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conditions and the character of the people, and is in some places harsher and in some places milder.
“Some places subjects are truly slaves. In other places the power of kings is limited by laws and a
certain liberty conceded to the people.”78 Melanchthon then cites 1 Samuel 8 to argue that “the
harshest form of rule” is also approved by God and described as the right of kings. Both liberty and
servitude, however, have certain limits according to natural law. Natural law commands that slaves
must have enough to sustain their families, and lords may therefore not take everything at will.
Likewise liberty is limited by natural law in such a way that we are commanded to do what is
necessary “in order to maintain common society” - such as obeying rulers and paying taxes.79 There
is  therefore  no  necessary  opposition  between  subjection  in  the  form  of  slavery  and  political
subjection, and they are not mutually exclusive, according to Melanchthon. Instead he emphasises
their common character as forms of rule. Natural law, then, is both constitutive of political authority
and limits its legitimate exercise.
Although there are important similarities between Melanchthon's concept of dominium and that of
the Ockhamists, as I have shown in section II, Melanchthon's political naturalism means that there
are significant differences as well. To illustrate this point, we may turn to again to Melanchthon's
case against Wycliff. For Biel and Mair, natural and civil dominium are distinct, the first existing by
nature and the second being introduced by convention. According to Melanchthon, by contrast, civil
dominium, in the sense of political authority, is “the execution of natural dominium” since after the
Fall political authority with the power to enforce the law became necessary. 
For natural dominium may also be defined in this way, that it is the law of nature which ordains that
some rule so that they may restrain the evil  people. For it is certain that Adam retained a natural
knowledge of the law, in the same way as he retained the use of reason. In turn civil dominium is the
execution  of  natural  dominium.  For  for  societies to  be  governed  in  an  orderly  way  (ut  ordine
administrentur respublicae) it is necessary to entrust governmental power to certain specific persons
21
and to prevent the rest from governing. This is called civil  dominium,  and it is a certain effect of
natural dominium.80
The fact that “Adae comissum est  imperium in familiam,” along with Genesis 9,6 and the fourth
commandment,  shows  that  dominium civile  –  that  some  rule  and  some  obey –  is  the  natural
ordination of God.81 This was precisely not the case for either Mair or Biel, where the paternal rule
only becomes political rule through the consent of the ruled and the community confers imperium
on the ruler.  Mair  had used Aristotle's  distinction between paternal and political  to support the
conventionalist account where the ruler's power is ministerial in relation to the community, derived
from the people; Melanchthon, while collapsing the two, used Aristotle in such a way that the ruler's
power became ministerial in relation to God.82
IV
Given the fact that Aristotle explicitly rejected the opinion that paternal and political authority is of
the same kind, and the important use to which this distinction was put by his contemporaries, it is
natural to ask whether and how Melanchthon deals with Aristotle's explicit distinction. It would be
remarkable if it would be simply ignored, being present in both the Politics and the Nicomachean
Ethics. Melanchthon does indeed remark on this distinction, not in his commentary on the Politics,
but in his commentary on the fifth book of the Ethics published alongside the commentary on the
Politics in the 1535 edition. As would be expected, his discussion of this problem in the Ethics is
compatible with his arguments in his commentary on the Politics. The passage in question is from
chapter 6 of book 5 where Aristotle discusses “political justice,” which is found among “people who
are free and either proportionally or arithmetically equal.”83 Here Aristotle explicitly argues that
“what  is  just  for  a  master  and for  a  father  are  not  the  same as”  political  justice,  because  the
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politically just or unjust “depend on law, and exist only among people where law is natural, namely,
those who share equally in ruling and being ruled.”84 In commenting on this passage Melanchthon
argues, with some plausibility, that the difference between the “herile & Paternum iustum” and the
“civile  iustum” refers  to the necessity of the rule  of  law in societies.  The rule  of  law is  what
distinguishes political government from tyrannical government, and laws create a certain form of
equality between ruler and ruled. “And this palce excellently teaches us about the dignity of the
laws, to consider why they would be necessary, namely that they ensure equality between the ruler
and the citizens, so that the magistrate does not impose more [upon the citizens] than the law and
right reason prescribes.”85 Although this is a far cry from the popular sovereignty propagated by
Melanchthon's contemporaries, it shows that to Melanchthon the rule of kings should be rule by law
as  well  as  limited  by  laws,  both  natural  and  positive.  Political  equality  and  justice  is,  for
Melanchthon, subjection to the law on the part of both ruler and ruled.
Accordingly the longest discussion in the commentary is devoted to the discussion of laws,
and the question of whether the commonwealth should be governed according to the will of a good
prince or according to written and certain justice or laws.86 Melanchthon agrees with Aristotle that it
is better for the  commonwealth to be governed by written laws, since “the law is reason without
passion” and he cites  with approval  Aristotle's  dictum that  “he who bids  the law rule  may be
deemed to bid God and reason alone rule.  And they that wish for a  man to rule  put beasts  in
charge.”87 The reason, then, why rulers must govern in accordance with law is essentially the same
as why subjection is necessary in the first place: the weakness of the human nature.
Given that  he concurs with Aristotle  that  it  is  better  for the laws than for men to rule,
Melanchthon's  use  of  the  French  parliaments,  the  German  electors,  and  the  Spartan  ephors  as
examples  of  the  custodes earlier  in  the  Commentarii  is  therefore  normative  and  not  merely
descriptive. In that the  custodes  have the right to enforce the law against the rulers  Melanchthon
operates  with a  certain  distinction  or  division of  powers  within the governmental  structure  (or
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constitution), and the laws are as such to be considered part of the constitution. As he emphasises in
the section on laws, Romans 13 calls the laws God's ordination, “for without laws, judges and civil
ordinances  there  would  is  no  order  in  government”.88 The  safeguard  against  abuse  of  political
authority is thus not, as in the conciliarist tradition, the ultimate authority of the community or the
people over the ruler. Instead it is a configuration of powers within the structure of government. It is
not the community that acts to constrain a bad ruler, but rather persons invested with governmental
or political power on their own.
Following from the preceding discussion, I want to suggest further that Melanchthon's polemics in
the commentary on the  Politics shed important light on crucial passages on his 1528  Scholia on
Paul's letter to the Colossians. The passage commenting on verse 23, which Melanchthon argues
provides a “Christian politics,” discusses the relationship between Scripture and philosophy.
For it teaches what the office of rulers is, that it pleases God, that it is being defended and conserved
by God, and that subjects must diligently obey their rulers. Some people read the political books of the
philosophers, which I also cherish and wish to be read, since they contain many morally good precepts
(honesta praecepta). But it is much more useful to have these scriptural passages diligently read than
the disputations of the philosophers, which, since they can teach us nothing about the will of God
towards rulers,  do not  show us what  is  the firmest  foundation of political  authority (firmissimum
presidium magistratuum). Neither will the subjects be able to fulfil their duties for long if they think
that commonwealths have been created by the decision of men (homano tantum consilio constitutas
esse respublicas),  and think that  they may avenge themselves against  rulers who have done them
wrong (iniurias magistratuum arbitrabuntur licere ulcisci).89 
This passage clearly shows Melanchthon's problem with contemporary Ockhamist political thought.
The conventionalist account - “that commonwealths have been created by the decision of men” - is
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liable  to  lead  to  rebellion  against  rulers.  The preceding discussion suggests  that  already in the
Scholia of 1528, Melanchthon had the positions of Biel and Mair in mind. And it is this concern
with  the  danger  of  rebellion,  as  evidenced  by  the  peasant  uprisings  in  1525,  that  informs
Melanchthon's  use of Aristotle.  There are  further  parallels  to support this  conclusion.  First,  the
notion of the ruler as the vicar of God is prominent both in the  Scholia and is emphasised in the
introduction to the  Commentarii. Secondly, in both writings Genesis 9,6 is adduced to show that
imperium has been ordained by God.90 The Commentarii, then, is an elaboration on what it means to
say that political authority exists according to the will of God, namely that it exists according to
natural law, and that it is part of the divinely ordained natural order.
There  is  some  evidence  that  before  the  events  of  1525  Melanchthon  held  a  position
significantly closer to that of Biel and Mair. In fact, as late as 1523 Melanchthon was arguing that
rulers  derive their  imperium from the people.  This was in the context  of giving an opinion on
whether it would be just for the Prince-Elector of Saxony Frederick the Wise to wage war against
the Emperor in order to defend Luther and the Gospel. On this occasion Melanchthon argued that
the Prince would not have just cause, since he could only legitimately wage war with the consent of
the people from whom he had received imperium. In this case, the people would not want war to be
waged  on  behalf  of  the  gospel  since  they  did  not  believe.91 In  light  of  the  Scholia and  the
Commentarii it seems that Melanchthon abandoned this theory in favour of the concept of the ruler
as the worldly representative of God, both under the influence of the peasant uprisings and the
writings of Luther, and consequently abandoned the theory of consent.
Given that Melanchthon used Aristotle in the  Commentarii to argue against the key principles in
Ockhamist political thought, which are recognised to have been instrumental to the development of
constitutional  monarchy, are  we,  then,  justified  in  characterising  Melanchthon's  position  as
essentially absolutist? This is a question that has been explicitly affirmed in recent scholarship on
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the  Commentary,92 and one could argue that there are elements that point in the direction of later
absolutist  thinkers  such  as  Robert  Filmer.  It  is  true  that  for  Melanchthon,  and  Luther,  it  is
illegitimate  for  subjects  to  resist  their  rulers.  But  this  is  true  for  most  of  Melanchthon's
contemporaries and even in the conciliarists, where it is only the community as a whole that may
resist the ruler. There are admittedly some concrete similarities between Filmer and Melanchthon in
his Commentarii. First, there is the common opposition to the “scholastic” political thought,93 that is
to say, the conciliarist principles discussed in section II above. Second, Filmer mentions a variety of
means by which the king may come to power, a list similar to that given by Melanchthon, and as in
the work of Melanchthon there is no mention of the idea that they should all be reducible to original
consent. Third, and more striking, is the similarity between Melanchthon's assertion that Adam “was
given imperium in the family” in accordance with natural law, and Filmer's argument that all kings
derive their title to rule from the power Adam originally held over his family, and that this title is
according to natural law. Likewise Filmer stressed the fourth commandment as a confirmation of
the “Natural Right of Regal Power.”94
None the less, there are important reasons to resist the characterisation of Melanchthon as an
absolutist  of Filmer's  kind.  Filmer had constructed a theory of “particularistic  inegalitarianism”
where certain identifiable persons inherited their power from Adam.95 Melanchthon never argued
that all later titles to rule are derived from that of Adam or as such derived from paternal power.
Rather Adam's title to rule is only one example of political authority in accordance with natural law.
Rather  than  a  particularistic  theory  of  inequality,  Melanchthon  forwarded  a  general  theory  of
inequality as the basis of political rule. But as was remarked above, this is not a theory of inequality
between to identifiable groups, but rather points to the weakness of human nature, the fact that men
need to be coerced by governmental authority and the rule of law for the maintenance of human
society. And this goes for subjects as well as rulers.
Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that Melanchthon wrote his commentary well before
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Bodin developed his theory of sovereignty, which is absolutely fundamental to  the conception of
political authority found in Filmer and other absolutists. While Melanchthon defines a king as “a
highest power, over which no superior magistrate judges,” as we have seen it is not a problem for
him to speak of a second form of kingship as “supreme power (summum imperium) circumscribed
by written law” over which the rule of law is enforced by  custodes in obvious contrast to later
absolutist writers. If we define absolutist monarchy as the unitary and undivided rule of one king
who is above the laws and subject only to God, then Melanchthon's conception of political authority
and order in the Commentarii is decidedly not absolutist.
V
This article has shown that the most important intellectual context for understanding the political
position  that  Melanchthon  was  developing  his  commentary  on  Aristotle's  Politics was  the  late
mediaeval Ockhamist political thought of Gabriel Biel and John Mair. Using Aristotle's naturalism
within the theological framework of the political order as ordained by God Melanchthon counters
the  conventionalist  account  of  the  Ockhamists  where  the  ruler's  authority  is  derived  from the
consent of the people, which he sees as potentially seditious. Rather than being grounded in human
law and the consent of the people, political order – servitus and imperium – is grounded in natural
law.  Lutheran  political  thought  as  developed  by  Melanchthon  may  thus  be  characterised  as
depending crucially on the notion of government as ordained by God – the magistratus as vicarius
Dei – in accordance with the laws of nature.
This does not, however, mean that Melanchthon's account of political authority is absolutist.
As evidenced by the arguments for resistance developed by Melanchthon the figure of Romans 13
is quite flexible, allowing for a notion of limited constitutional monarchy. Rather than the power of
the people or the community to depose the ruler Melanchthon emphasises the rule of law, natural
and positive as a corrective to the abuse of political authority. In addition to his natural law account
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of  government  as  such,  Melanchthon develops  a  form of  constitutionalism where  according to
positive law there is a certain division of powers within the governmental structure, and in this case
kings are not, as Melanchthon put it,  αὐτοκράτορες or  ἀνυπεύθυνοι. In the end, it is necessary for
both rulers and subjects to be restrained by law. Melanchthon's political thought, then, suggests that
it is theoretically possible to develop constitutionalist position separated from notions of popular
sovereignty and instead  grounded in  natural  and positive  law.  The  development  of  theories  of
constitutionalism may not necessarily be tied as closely to the arguments of John Mair and other
late mediaeval conciliarists as has been suggested by the existing scholarship. This, however, is a
historical  question  that  cannot  be  answered  on  the  basis  of  an  analysis  of  Melanchthon's
Commentarii, and as such it exceeds the limits of this article.
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